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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
Appellees/cross-appellants are 23 of 28 former yard and clerical 
employees of Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc. ("PTL") who asserted 
that appellant/cross-appellee Pacific Rail Services ("Pacific 
Rail") engaged in age discrimination in violation of the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (the "LAD") by failing to hire 
them in 1990.  Since the trial in this case, the United States 
Supreme Court has issued a decision clarifying the standards by 
which federal employment discrimination cases are to be judged.  
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).  Because 
we believe the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt Hicks's 
  
clarification of the test to be applied in federal discrimination 
cases in interpreting the LAD, we will vacate the judgment that 
was entered and remand for a new trial.  To assist the district 
court on remand, we will also decide several subsidiary issues 
relating to individual claims and plaintiffs. 
 I. 
Because our resolution of the legal issues will require a new 
trial, it is not necessary to discuss the facts in great detail.  
The following, however, provides some background to the dispute. 
Beginning in 1960, PTL performed lift operations -- loading and 
unloading freight from flat bed railroad cars -- for Consolidated 
Rail Corporation ("Conrail") at its North Bergen, New Jersey, 
terminal.  In July, 1990, however, after solicitation of bids by 
Conrail, Pacific Rail won the North Bergen contract, effective 
September 1, 1990. 
Upon learning that PTL had lost the North Bergen contract, PTL 
employees at the North Bergen terminal became interested in 
working for Pacific Rail at that site.  Pacific Rail 
representatives testified at trial, however, that even before 
submitting its bid, Pacific Rail had decided not to simply hire 
all of the PTL/North Bergen yard and clerical workers 
"wholesale," because Pacific Rail was concerned about the 
attitudes and work habits of some of the workers.1 
                     
1
.   Plaintiffs at trial disputed both the sincerity of Pacific 
Rail's concern and the accuracy of Pacific Rail's 
characterization of the PTL employees at North Bergen. 
  
Instead, upon winning the North Bergen contract, Pacific Rail 
apparently undertook a three-step hiring process.  First, Pacific 
Rail offered positions to its own employees at Conrail's 
Elizabeth, New Jersey ("E-Rail") terminal on a "promote from 
within" theory.  (Pay rates at North Bergen were higher than at 
E-Rail, so a move to North Bergen was effectively a promotion, 
according to the Pacific Rail representatives.)  Testimony 
indicated that one of the six yard and clerical employees 
transferred from E-Rail on this basis was over 40 years old. 
Pacific Rail next offered employment to three Conrail clerks and 
two PTL employees from the nearby Conrail/PTL terminal at Kearny, 
New Jersey.  The three Conrail offerees (only two of whom 
accepted their offers) were over 40.  The two PTL offerees (both 
of whom accepted) were under 40. 
Finally, Pacific Rail hired all 11 applicants referred by the 
union local that represented yard and clerical employees at E-
Rail.  Of these, one was over 40. 
As of September 1, only a limited number of positions in North 
Bergen remained open.  Pacific Rail apparently offered employment 
to two former PTL/North Bergen yard employees who were over 40, 
but both refused the offer.  Then a former PTL supervisor working 
for Pacific Rail recommended for hire four former PTL/North 
Bergen yard employees, two of whom were in their 20s and two of 
whom were over 40.  Pacific Rail offered employment to the 
younger two, and they accepted.  To fill a remaining clerk 
position, Pacific Rail made offers to two former PTL/North Bergen 
clerical employees, both over 40, but both declined.  Ultimately, 
  
instead of simply filling the clerk position, Pacific Rail 
transferred a person who was over 40 from E-Rail to assist with 
clerical work and act as office manager. 
To summarize, prior to September 1, Pacific Rail had apparently 
hired 21 employees, none of whom came from the pool of PTL 
employees at North Bergen.  Only four of these 21 individuals 
were over 40 years old.  After September 1, Pacific Rail hired 
either three or four more employees, at least two of whom were 
under 40 and from PTL/North Bergen and at least one of whom was 
over 40 and formerly with E-Rail.2  Thus, of the 25 yard and 
clerical employees that the evidence showed Pacific Rail hired to 
work at North Bergen, either 19 or 20 were under 40 years old. 
The 28 former PTL/North Bergen yard and clerical employees who 
filed this lawsuit were over 40.  They alleged that Pacific 
Rail's failure to hire them was due to age discrimination in 
violation of the LAD.  A jury found in favor of 18 of the 28 
employees and awarded them a total of more than $7 million 
($1,448,000 in back pay and $5,743,500 in front pay).  Both 
Pacific Rail and the 18 verdict winners, plus five plaintiffs 
whose claims were dismissed by the district court, appeal and 
cross-appeal several issues. 
                     
2
.   Curiously, the record is somewhat ambiguous as to whether 
three or four additional employees were hired after 
September 1.  Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 indicates that Pacific 
Rail hired a total of 25 persons.  The parties agree that 21 
were hired prior to September 1.  That would leave four to 
be hired after September 1, but, as discussed in the text, 
the parties specifically discuss only three employees hired 
after that date.  The discrepancy is immaterial for our 
purposes, as we are certain it will be clarified on remand. 
  
 II. 
The primary issue presented involves the delicate task of 
predicting how the New Jersey Supreme Court would interpret and 
apply the LAD in the aftermath of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 
2742 (1993).  As a federal court sitting in diversity, the 
district court was, and we are, obliged to apply state 
substantive law.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 
Colantuno v. Aetna Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 908, 909 (3d Cir. 1992).  
In so doing, we are not free to impose our own view of what state 
law should be; we are to apply state law as interpreted by the 
state's highest court.  Id.  In the absence of guidance from that 
court we are to refer to decisions of the state's intermediate 
appellate courts for assistance in determining how the highest 
court would rule.  Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 
113 (3d Cir. 1992); Fisher v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 
1103, 1105 (3d Cir. 1992).  In cases such as this, where neither 
the state supreme court nor any intermediate appellate courts 
have spoken to the issue at hand, our task of predicting state 
law becomes even more complicated.  Nevertheless, we must proceed 
into these uncharted waters, using pronouncements from the New 
Jersey Supreme Court on analogous issues as our compass. 
 A. 
In Hicks, the Supreme Court considered "whether, in a suit 
against an employer alleging intentional racial discrimination in 
violation of [Title VII], the trier of fact's rejection of the 
employer's asserted reasons for its actions mandates a finding 
  
for the plaintiff."  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.  Under the 
familiar McDonnell Douglas shifting-burden analysis applicable to 
federal employment discrimination cases involving indirect proof 
of discrimination, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a 
relatively simple prima facie case, which the employer must rebut 
by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 
actions.  See generally Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 
F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1987).3  Prior to Hicks, we had held that 
a finding that a defendant employer had articulated false reasons 
mandated entry of judgment for plaintiff.  See Chipollini, 814 
F.2d at 898; Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 
1393, 1395-96 (3d Cir. 1984).  Hicks changed that:  the Court 
ruled definitively that a finding that an employer had 
articulated a pretextual reason for its actions does not mandate 
judgment for a plaintiff.  Instead, "a reason cannot be proved to 
be `a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that 
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real 
reason."  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.  Thus, "[t]hat the 
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.   The McDonnell Douglas analysis was derived from McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See also 
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981).  Although McDonnell Douglas itself involved 
allegations of intentional (disparate treatment) 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the shifting burden 
analysis with which the case name is now synonymous also 
has been applied in section 1983 cases, section 1981 cases 
and age discrimination cases.  See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 
2746-47 n.1; Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., slip op. at 8 n.7 
No. 93-3544 (3d Cir. June 8, 1994); Geary v. Visitation of 
the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 329 & n.4 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
  
employer's proffered reason [for its actions] is unpersuasive, or 
even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the 
plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct."  Id. at 2756 
(emphasis added).  In our most recent decisions addressing this 
issue, we have followed this teaching that a finding of pretext 
may lead to a reasonable inference of discriminatory motives, but 
it does not automatically compel a finding of discrimination.  
See Miller v. CIGNA Corp., slip op. at 19-20, No. 93-1773 (3d 
Cir. June 28, 1994); Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., slip op. at 9, 
No. 93-3544 (3d Cir. June 8, 1994); Geary v. Visitation of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 329 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 B. 
In this LAD case, the district court instructed the jury several 
times that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that they 
were not hired because of their age.  See App. at 91-93.  The 
court also instructed the jury that in evaluating Pacific Rail's 
asserted legitimate business reasons for its actions, they were 
to decide whether those reasons were its true reasons or whether 
they "ha[d] been presented to hide or avoid disclosure of the 
true reason, namely:  age discrimination."  App. at 94.  In 
summarizing the charge, the court said: 
If I may recap for you, if you find that plaintiff has 
established . . . either, one, that his/her age was a 
determining factor "but for" which he/she would have 
been hired; or two, that the reasons advanced by the 
defendant for not hiring plaintiff were a pretext, a 
reason or reasons unworthy of credence, then plaintiff 
will have established his/her claim of intentional age 
discrimination and you must return a verdict in his/her 
favor.  If, however, he/she has failed to establish 
  
either of those two propositions, then your verdict 
must be in favor of the defendant. 
App. at 94-95 (emphasis added).  Clearly, these instructions 
would be an incorrect statement of federal law after Hicks.4 
 C. 
The question, however, is whether the New Jersey courts would 
apply Hicks in an LAD case.5  Hicks, of course, involved the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of federal anti-
discrimination statutes and case law.  Whether the New Jersey 
Supreme Court will decide that the same principles apply in cases 
brought under the LAD is another question. 
                     
4
.   Pacific Rail requested a jury instruction explaining that 
even if the jury rejected Pacific Rail's rationale as 
unsupported by the evidence or false, the jury would 
nevertheless still need to find that the plaintiffs met 
their burden of proving wrongful discrimination.  Suppl. 
App. at 2799.  The district court did not give this 
instruction. 
5
.   Pacific Rail contends that plaintiffs are estopped from 
arguing that Hicks does not apply because the plaintiffs 
contended throughout this litigation that New Jersey courts 
generally follow federal law in this area.  Plaintiffs 
certainly have consistently taken the position that the 
standards and allocations of proof applicable to federal 
Title VII cases apply in cases involving the LAD.  But on 
these facts we cannot say plaintiffs are estopped from 
arguing that Hicks does not apply.  Trial took place in 
September, 1992, and post-trial motions were decided in 
March and April, 1993.  Hicks was not decided until June, 
1993.  Until then, our position on this issue, which the 
district court was bound to follow, was one the plaintiffs 
believed the New Jersey Supreme Court would also follow.  
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has since 
disavowed our position should not foreclose the plaintiffs 
from arguing that the New Jersey Supreme Court might 
nonetheless decide to adopt the approach taken in Title VII 
cases in this circuit before Hicks. 
  
The LAD provides: 
  It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, 
as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination: 
 
  a.  For an employer, because of the race, creed, 
color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, 
affectional or sexual orientation, sex or atypical 
hereditary cellular or blood trait of any individual, 
or because of the liability for service in the Armed 
Forces of the United States or the nationality of any 
individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to 
discharge or require to retire, unless justified by 
lawful considerations other than age, from employment 
such individual or to discriminate against such 
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment . . . . 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12(a).  First enacted in 1945, well before 
federal legislative attempts to eliminate discrimination in the 
workplace, the LAD was intended by the New Jersey legislature to 
eradicate "the cancer of discrimination."  Jackson v. Concord 
Co., 54 N.J. 113, 124, 253 A.2d 793, 799 (1969); see Lehmann v. 
Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 600, 626 A.2d 445, 451 (1993).6  
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.   The New Jersey legislature has provided: 
 
  All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain 
employment . . . without discrimination because of 
race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, 
age, marital status, affectional or sexual 
orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only 
to conditions and limitations applicable alike to 
all persons.  This opportunity is recognized and 
declared to be a civil right. 
 
 N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-4.  It has clearly stated the intent 
behind the LAD within the statute itself: 
 
   The Legislature finds and declares that 
practices of discrimination against any of its 
inhabitants, because of race, creed, color, 
national origin, ancestry, age, sex, affectional 
or sexual orientation, marital status, familial 
status, liability for service in the Armed Forces 
  
The New Jersey Supreme Court has generally looked to standards 
developed under federal anti-discrimination law for guidance in 
construing the LAD.  Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600, 626 A.2d at 452.  
The New Jersey Court has adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
(..continued) 
of the United States, or nationality, are matters 
of concern to the government of the State, and 
that such discrimination threatens not only the 
rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of 
the State but menaces the institutions and 
foundation of a free democratic State; provided, 
however, that nothing in this expression of policy 
prevents the making of legitimate distinctions 
between citizens and aliens when required by 
federal law or otherwise necessary to promote the 
national interest. 
 
   The Legislature further declares its 
opposition to such practices of discrimination 
. . . in order that the economic prosperity and 
general welfare of the inhabitants of the State 
may be protected and ensured. 
 
   The Legislature further finds that because of 
discrimination, people suffer personal hardships, 
and the State suffers a grievous harm.  The 
personal hardships include:  economic loss; time 
loss; physical and emotional stress; and in some 
cases severe emotional trauma, illness, 
homelessness or other irreparable harm resulting 
from the strain of employment controversies; 
relocation, search and moving difficulties; 
anxiety caused by lack of information, 
uncertainty, and resultant planning difficulty; 
career, education, family and social disruptions; 
and adjustment problems, which particularly impact 
on those protected by this act.  Such harms have, 
under the common law, given rise to legal 
remedies, including compensatory and punitive 
damages.  The Legislature intends that such 
damages be available to all persons protected by 
this act and that this act shall be liberally 
construed in combination with other protections 
available under the laws of this State. 
 
 N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-3. 
  
although it has noted that it has never "embraced the McDonnell 
Douglas test literally, invariably, or inflexibly."  Grigoletti 
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 97-98, 570 A.2d 903, 907 
(1990).  Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court has demonstrated a 
marked willingness, and has instructed New Jersey courts in 
general, to treat the McDonnell Douglas test as "only a general 
framework for analyzing unlawful discrimination claims" which 
"must be modified where appropriate."  Erickson v. Marsh & 
McLennan Co., Inc., 117 N.J. 539, 550, 569 A.2d 793, 799 (1990); 
see generally Carrington v. RCA Global Commun., Inc., 762 F. 
Supp. 632, 644-45 (D. N.J. 1991) (noting that "[t]here is little 
reason to believe that New Jersey courts will exhibit slavish 
devotion to federal law in interpreting the NJLAD"). 
Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court has refused to apply the 
McDonnell Douglas framework in LAD cases alleging gender 
discrimination in the form of unequal pay, Grigoletti, supra; 
modified the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 
in the context of reverse discrimination failure-to-hire cases, 
Erickson, supra; and shifted to employers the burden of proving 
the validity of their decisions in some handicap discrimination 
cases.  Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363, 
541 A.2d 682 (1988).  See also Jamison v. Rockaway Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., 242 N.J. Super. 436, 445-47, 577 A.2d 177, 183 (1990) 
(establishing a variation of the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
apply in cases alleging a retaliatory failure to promote).  
Plaintiffs point to this willingness to modify the McDonnell 
Douglas framework as evidence that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
  
would disregard Hicks and instead hold that a plaintiff asserting 
a claim of employment discrimination pursuant to the LAD is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if he or she has proven a 
prima facie case and has demonstrated that the reason or reasons 
the employer gave for the challenged employment action were 
false. 
 It is true that the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken to heart 
the legislature's expressed intention that the LAD is to be 
construed liberally.  See supra note 6.  It is also true, 
however, that the legislature has admonished New Jersey courts to 
construe the provisions of the LAD "fairly and justly with due 
regard to the interests of all parties," N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-27, 
as the New Jersey Supreme Court itself recognized in Andersen v. 
Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 496, 446 A.2d 486, 492 (1982).  Read 
together, these admonitions are not inconsistent with one another 
and are both significant to and instructive in our search for 
guidance.  As we explain more fully below, because the New Jersey 
legislature intended to protect and compensate victims of 
discrimination but not to relieve them of the burden of proving 
unlawful discrimination, and because the New Jersey rule 
regarding presumptions parallels the federal rule on presumptions 
upon which the Hicks Court based its decision, we predict that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would endorse Hicks's view that a 
plaintiff in a discrimination case is not entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law simply because he or she proves a prima facie 
case and that the reason or reasons asserted by his or her 
employer for the challenged action were false. 
  
Our decision is informed by a number of observations concerning 
New Jersey law.  First, under New Jersey law, as under federal 
law, plaintiffs have always retained the ultimate burden of 
demonstrating that the actions they challenged were due to 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of 
Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 87, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (1978); Kearny 
Generating Sys. v. Roper, 184 N.J. Super. 253, 445 A.2d 1159 
(1982).7  Our understanding of the McDonnell Douglas framework 
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.   We acknowledge that the New Jersey Supreme Court has not 
always been entirely clear on this point.  In Peper, the 
case in which it decided to adopt the McDonnell Douglas 
shifting burden scheme, the court stated in dicta that it 
agreed with the statements of a federal judge who described 
the McDonnell Douglas scheme as shifting the burden of 
proof, rather than simply of production, to the defendant 
once a prima facie case has been made out.  Peper, 77 N.J. 
at 84, 389 A.2d at 480.  The focus of Peper, however, was 
on the plaintiff's inability to establish a prima facie 
case.  That and numerous statements since by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court and superior courts confirming that the 
burden of proof does not shift (e.g., Goodman v. London 
Metals Exch., Inc., 86 N.J. 19, 429 A.2d 341 (1981); 
Kearny, supra), convince us that this single statement in 
Peper cannot serve as a basis for concluding that the court 
would refuse to incorporate the principles of Hicks into 
the law of the LAD. 
 
 Similarly, statements in Jamison v. Rockaway Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., 242 N.J. Super. 436, 577 A.2d 177 (1990), do not 
sway our view of the burden placed on a plaintiff asserting 
a straightforward LAD claim.  In that case, the New Jersey 
Superior Court referred extensively to a decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Wrighten v. Metro. 
Hosp., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1984), describing the 
McDonnell Douglas formulation applicable in retaliatory 
discharge cases.  The Jamison court cited Wrighten as 
providing that an employee asserting a retaliatory 
discharge may "show by preponderating evidence that a 
discriminatory intent motivated the employer's action" by 
"proving that the articulated reason is a pretext for the 
retaliation or that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer."  Jamison, 242 N.J. Super. at 445, 
  
before Hicks similarly required that the plaintiff bear the 
ultimate burden of proving that the challenged employment action 
resulted from unlawful discrimination.  See, e.g., Billet v. 
CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 1991).  Our decisions 
finding that this burden could be borne merely by demonstrating 
that the asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the 
employer's actions were incredible were based on the weight given 
to the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case as a "presumption."  In 
other words, our (and other courts') reasoning that proving 
pretext entitled plaintiff to judgment reflected a belief that 
the presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiff's 
ability to make out a prima facie case had not been rebutted and 
was only strengthened by the proven falsity of the reasons the 
employer gave for its actions, thus mandating a decision that the 
employer's actions had been motivated by unlawful discrimination.  
See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762-63 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Hicks 
clarified that under federal law the presumption raised by 
establishment of the prima facie case no longer exists once an 
employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for its actions.  It does not hold that proving that reason false 
(..continued) 
577 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added).  Doing so, the court 
added, creates "a presumption . . . that the adverse 
employment action was the product of improper retaliatory 
intent.  . . .  Then, the employer must prove by the 
preponderance of the evidence that the adverse action would 
have been taken regardless of retaliatory intent."  Id. at 
445-46, 577 A.2d at 182.  The shifting of the ultimate 
burden in a retaliatory discrimination case does not 
necessarily imply that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
advocate any shift or lessening of the burden in a 
straightforward failure-to-hire case. 
  
will never suffice to support a decision for a plaintiff; it 
merely establishes that the plaintiff does not merit judgment as 
a matter of law once falsity is proven. 
In thus clarifying the law, the Court in Hicks referred to and 
relied upon Federal Rule of Evidence 301, concerning 
presumptions.8  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; see also id. at 2749 
("[T]he Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the 
defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff 
disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a 
presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our 
repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times 
bears the `ultimate burden of persuasion.'").  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has similarly interpreted the LAD, describing the 
prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas test as establishing a 
"rebuttable presumption" of discrimination.  Erickson, 117 N.J. 
at 551, 569 A.2d at 799.  It has also stated that when a 
defendant rebuts the presumption by articulating a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the inference of 
discrimination which literally arose from the plaintiff's 
evidence is destroyed.  Goodman v. London Metals Exch., Inc., 86 
                     
8
.   Rule 301 provides: 
 
   In all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by 
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party 
against whom it is directed the burden of going 
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the 
presumption, but does not shift to such party the 
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of 
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial 
upon the party on whom it was originally cast. 
  
N.J. 19, 33, 429 A.2d at 341, 348 (1981).  Therefore, 
corresponding reference to the New Jersey Rule of Evidence 
regarding presumptions seems appropriate, and our reference 
thereto provides further support for the conclusion that New 
Jersey would clarify the law of the LAD as the Court in Hicks 
clarified Title VII jurisprudence. 
Like Federal Rule of Evidence 301, New Jersey Rule of Evidence 
3019 provides that the introduction of evidence to rebut a 
presumption destroys that presumption, leaving only that evidence 
and its inferences to be judged against the competing evidence 
and its inferences to determine the ultimate question at issue 
(in an LAD case, the question of whether the defendant illegally 
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.   The rule provides: 
 
  Except as otherwise provided in Rule 303 or 
by other law, a presumption discharges the 
burden of producing evidence as to a fact 
(the presumed fact) when another fact (the 
basic fact) has been established. 
 
  If evidence is introduced tending to disprove 
the presumed fact, the issue shall be 
submitted to the trier of fact for 
determination unless the evidence is such 
that reasonable persons would not differ as 
to the existence or nonexistence of the 
presumed fact.  If no evidence tending to 
disprove the presumed fact is presented, the 
presumed fact shall be deemed established if 
the basic fact is found or otherwise 
established.  The burden of persuasion as to 
the proof or disproof of the presumed fact 
does not shift to the party against whom the 
presumption is directed unless otherwise 
required by law.  Nothing in this rule shall 
preclude the judge from commenting on 
inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence. 
  
discriminated against the plaintiff).  Specifically, it states 
that "[i]f evidence is introduced tending to disprove the 
presumed fact, the issue shall be submitted to the trier of fact 
for determination unless the evidence is such that reasonable 
persons would not differ as to the existence or nonexistence of 
the presumed fact."  The commentary to the rule provides that "a 
valid presumption can be used to establish a prima facie case, 
but the presumption normally disappears in the face of 
conflicting evidence.  Nevertheless, any logical inference which 
can be drawn from the basic fact remains."  N.J. R. Evid. 301, 
1994 supplemental comment.10  Therefore, the rule states with 
regard to state law exactly what Hicks has explained to be the 
operation of federal anti-discrimination law under the McDonnell 
Douglas shifting burden analysis.  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
may choose, as a policy matter, to interpret the LAD even more 
broadly, so that the usual rules governing presumptions do not 
apply in LAD cases, cf. N.J. R. Evid. 301 (rule governs "[e]xcept 
as otherwise provided . . . by other law"), but in the face of 
this explicit explanation of the operation of presumptions under 
New Jersey law, we cannot make that state law policy decision for 
it.  Compare Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 
225, 288-29 (N.D. 1993) (refusing to adopt Hicks formulation 
because of different state rule on presumptions). 
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.   Rule 301 replaced N.J. R. Evid. 14, cited by the PTL 
employees, effective July 1, 1993.  Commentary to it 
indicates that Rule 301 reflects established New Jersey 
law. 
  
This is particularly true in light of the New Jersey courts' 
general adoption of federal anti-discrimination law as their 
guidepost.  Indeed, the courts' willingness to depart from 
federal precedent in the anti-discrimination area has occurred in 
only three contexts, involving either modification of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to fit specific factual situations 
(e.g., Erickson and Jansen), departure from that framework in 
accordance with cases decided by various federal courts of 
appeals (Grigoletti), or departure from the standards we apply in 
favor of what it believes to be a more sensible interpretation of 
United States Supreme Court precedent (Lehmann).  It has never 
rejected outright the United States Supreme Court's approach to 
federal anti-discrimination law; to the contrary, it has noted 
that there exists "an imputed but strong legislative intent to 
harmonize the State's anti-discrimination statutes with the 
dominant federal view to maximize the protections for the victims 
of discrimination and . . . to benefit all of society by these 
efforts."  Grigoletti, 118 N.J. at 108, 570 A.2d at 913. 
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Goodman 
provides further support for our decision, if only by 
implication.  In Goodman, the court considered a case in which a 
company and its principals argued that a hearing examiner in the 
New Jersey Division on Civil Rights had misapplied the burden of 
proof.  The complainant, a female job applicant, established a 
prima facie case that she had not been hired because of her 
gender.  The respondents contended that she was not granted an 
interview because her attitude had been unpleasant.  The hearing 
  
examiner nevertheless ruled for the complainant, stating that the 
"`case ultimately turns on credibility'" and that he believed the 
complainant.  Goodman, 86 N.J. at 33, 429 A.2d at 348.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the hearing examiner had properly 
applied the McDonnell Douglas shifting burden scheme: 
  The explanation given by respondents for 
complainant's rejection was sufficient for the employer 
to meet its burden of articulating a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection and thus 
destroy `the legally mandatory inference of 
discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial 
evidence.'  . . .  However, the trier of fact may 
nevertheless be persuaded by that evidence and its 
inferences combined with that adduced from the 
respondents that the employer's proposed explanation is 
unworthy of belief and is nothing more than a mere 
pretext for unlawful discrimination. 
Goodman, 86 N.J. at 33, 429 A.2d at 348 (emphasis added).  In 
explaining why it believed the hearing examiner had correctly 
applied McDonnell Douglas, the court stated not only that the 
hearing examiner had said he found the plaintiff and her witness 
to be truthful, but also that he had "concluded that the reason 
given by the employer for [the plaintiff's] rejection was 
pretextual and that the true reason for her rejection was 
`because she was a woman.'"  Id. at 33-34, 429 A.2d at 349 
(emphasis added).  Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not 
find that mere disbelief of the employer would support a decision 
for the complainant; it affirmed the hearing examiner's decision 
because he had disbelieved the employer and had decided that the 
true reason for the employer's failure to hire the plaintiff was 
unlawful discrimination.  This is consistent with Hicks and 
  
supports our belief that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
follow Hicks in interpreting the LAD. 
In conclusion, we are persuaded that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would ultimately determine that plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases under the LAD may not necessarily prevail 
merely by proving a prima facie case and rebutting an employer's 
asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.  
That level of proof may suffice if the factfinder believes that 
the employer offered false reasons to conceal unlawful 
discrimination, but it does not mandate entry of judgment for the 
plaintiff.  Instead, as provided in the New Jersey Rule of 
Evidence governing presumptions and their operation, the case 
must go to the factfinder for decision of the ultimate issue -- 
whether the employer had engaged in unlawful discrimination.  
Thus, the trial court erred in propounding jury instructions that 
would entitle the plaintiffs to judgment if they merely presented 
a prima facie case and demonstrated that the defendant's asserted 
grounds for decision were pretextual. 
 III. 
Our conclusion that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
incorporate the Hicks principles into its LAD jurisprudence 
requires that this case be retried.  We do not believe that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would choose to apply this clarification 
of New Jersey law only prospectively, as the PTL employees 
  
argue.11  Nor do we accept either side's contention that this 
case can be decided at the appellate level, without a remand. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's charge to the jury, 
instructing that they at all times bore the burden of proving 
that they were not hired because of their age, cured any error 
that may have occurred when the court instructed that they would 
win if they had proven that the reasons Pacific Rail advanced for 
failing to hire them were false.  We cannot agree, for while the 
trial court correctly placed the burden of proving illegal 
discrimination on the plaintiffs at all times, the statement 
rendered incorrect in light of Hicks was direct and explicit and 
served to summarize the charge for the jury.  If there was any 
portion of the charge that guided the jury's deliberations, it 
was more than likely the portion we have held to be erroneous. 
On the other hand, Pacific Rail contends that we need not remand 
this case but instead may enter judgment for it because the 
evidence was insufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiffs' 
favor even under an appropriate charge.  We cannot   agree with 
                     
11
.   The employees argue that, "[a]t a minimum, if the New 
Jersey Supreme Court were to follow Hicks it would only 
apply its holding prospectively."  Appellees/Cross-
Appellants' Brief at 16.  Unlike New Jersey law, 
"Prospective application is appropriate when a decision 
establishes a new principle of law by overruling past 
precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression."  
Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 295, 627 A.2d 654 (1993).  
As explained above, the New Jersey Supreme Court would not 
be overturning past precedent or deciding a new issue by 
following the Hicks approach; it would merely be clarifying 
prior decisions.  There is no reason to believe that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would choose to apply such a 
decision only prospectively. 
  
this contention, either.  Undeniably, plaintiffs' evidence was 
aimed mainly at proving pretext, but that evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict winner (Billet, 940 F.2d at 
817), could conceivably have supported a decision for the 
plaintiffs under the correct charge. 
In light of our inability to divine whether the jury's verdict 
was premised on correct or erroneous portions of the charge, we 
will remand the case for retrial under the principles we have set 
forth above. 
 IV. 
Some of the issues the parties have raised have been rendered 
moot by our decision thus far.12  Others, however, remain, for 
they determine whether certain claims are still properly at issue 
in this case and thus whether they should be addressed on remand. 
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.   Specifically, given that the judgment will be vacated and 
the case retried, we see no reason to decide whether the 
trial court erred in (1) refusing to order remittitur of 
some plaintiffs' backpay awards, (2) awarding plaintiffs 
prejudgment interest, or (3) refusing to order 
reinstatement. 
 
 We may quickly dispose of one issue raised by Pacific Rail 
which still must be resolved.  Pacific Rail argues that the 
district court erred in refusing to dismiss the cases of 
plaintiffs Phyllis Lindh, Sal Petruzzelli and Ed Dechert 
for failure to establish a prima facie case.  After 
reviewing the record, we do not agree that the district 
court erred.  Depending upon credibility judgments, which 
we are in no position to make, the evidence may be 
sufficient to support a verdict for each of these 
plaintiffs. 
  
 A. 
Among these is a question which arose after trial as to whether 
the plaintiffs were entitled to front pay awards.  Plaintiffs 
stated in their complaint that they sought "a judgment ordering 
defendant to offer them employment and to pay back wages, 
compensatory damages, punitive damages and attorneys' fees."  
App. at 14.  They alleged that as a result of Pacific Rail's 
actions they had "lost income and otherwise suffered the effects 
of discrimination on account of their age," App. at 20, and 
sought judgment "[o]rdering defendant to offer employment to 
plaintiffs and make them whole for all wages and benefits lost by 
reason of defendant's unlawful discrimination; granting 
compensatory damages to plaintiffs; . . . and [g]ranting any 
further relief the Court deems just and proper."  Id. at 21.  The 
final pretrial order, upon which the parties collaborated and 
which the magistrate judge handling pretrial matters reviewed and 
entered, said only that "[a]s a result of defendant's actions, 
plaintiffs have lost income and otherwise suffered the effects of 
discrimination on account of their age."  Id. at 42.  They were 
ordered to quantify their damages by March 16, 1992 (id.), but 
they did not do so.  The first mention of "front pay," or 
compensation for future lost earnings, surfaced two weeks prior 
to trial, when plaintiffs submitted proposed jury instructions 
requesting an instruction on front pay.  Id. at 2689, 2702.  Over 
an objection from Pacific Rail, the district court decided to 
charge on front pay, but after the jury returned a verdict of 
  
more than $5 million in front pay, the court granted a post-trial 
motion to strike the front pay award. 
 In light of the way this case developed, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in striking the plaintiffs' front pay 
award as a sanction for having failed to claim front pay prior to 
two weeks before trial (and even then only to mention it in 
proposed jury instructions, which included many items not at 
issue).  Plaintiffs argue that their request for "compensatory 
damages" encompasses an award of future lost earnings, but in the 
context of the pleadings filed in this case, we cannot say that 
their vague pleading style -- even under the lenient rules of 
notice pleading -- sufficed to put Pacific Rail on notice of a 
claim for front pay.  Moreover, had there been any question, the 
plaintiffs had every opportunity to clarify the damages they 
sought in the pretrial order.  When they failed to do so, the 
magistrate judge ordered quantification of their damages by a 
date certain -- an opportunity to put Pacific Rail on notice of 
their claims which the plaintiffs simply did not seize. 
In these circumstances, then, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in striking the plaintiffs' front pay awards at 
the conclusion of the first trial.  Rather than usurp the 
district court's role as presider over the second trial, we hold 
only that on remand it will be left to the sound discretion of 
the district court to determine in the interests of fairness and 
justice whether to allow any new claims. 
  
 B. 
Although the plaintiffs cannot claim front pay on remand, they 
will be permitted to seek emotional distress damages, contrary to 
the rulings of the magistrate judge and district court.  This 
case was originally bifurcated so that liability would be tried 
separately from damages.  The parties initially prepared their 
pretrial order with that in mind, but for some reason, presumably 
discussed during a pretrial conference with the magistrate judge, 
it was decided that the case would not be bifurcated.  App. at 
64.  Because they had apparently only envisioned a trial on 
liability prior to this, plaintiffs then sought permission to 
list exhibits regarding damages and to amend the pretrial order 
to list additional witnesses, who happened to be doctors, to 
support their claims of emotional distress damages.  App. at 
2746, 2761.  The magistrate judge permitted plaintiffs to include 
additional exhibits to support their claims for pecuniary damages 
(to which Pacific Rail did not object), but denied plaintiffs' 
request to name the doctors as witnesses.  In conjunction with 
that decision, the magistrate judge struck the plaintiffs' claims 
for emotional distress damages because he believed that 
"competent medical testimony of an expert nature . . . as to the 
causation of any emotional distress" was required.13  App. at 
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.   Significantly, the plaintiffs were not offering the doctors 
as expert witnesses, for they had no expert reports from 
which the doctors could state expert opinions.  App. at 
2759.  Instead, they intended that the doctors would 
testify as lay witnesses describing what they had observed.  
Thus, this is not a case in which a denial of a motion to 
amend to add the doctors as witnesses resulted in the lack 
of evidence for which the claims were dismissed.  Refusing 
  
2762.  The district court affirmed this ruling when plaintiffs 
appealed. 
Plaintiffs argue that their claims for emotional distress damages 
should not have been stricken.  In reviewing the magistrate 
judge's decision to this effect, the district court had to 
determine whether that decision was "clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law."  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1120 (3d Cir. 1986).  The question 
before the magistrate judge, the district court and us does not, 
as Pacific Rail argues, arise in the context of Rule 701 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (regarding opinion testimony by lay 
witnesses) but is instead a matter of New Jersey law concerning 
whether expert evidence is needed to prove emotional distress 
damages in this type of case.  We will thus determine whether the 
magistrate judge's decision to strike plaintiffs' claims for 
emotional distress damages was contrary to law.  Cf. Bolden v. 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 829 n.30 
(3d Cir. 1991) (whether district court properly dismissed 
punitive damages request is question of law subject to plenary 
review). 
"Emotional stress" damages may be recovered under the LAD.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 10:5-3; Milazzo v. Exxon Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 573, 
580 A.2d 1107 (1990).  New Jersey courts require expert testimony 
to prove the causal link between a claimed injury and the 
(..continued) 
to permit the doctors to testify merely lessened the number 
of lay witnesses who would be testifying for plaintiffs.  
It did not deprive them of expert testimony. 
  
tortious act alleged when the plaintiff is claiming that he or 
she suffered subjective injury (such as pain, humiliation, 
emotional distress) that is not obviously related to an 
identifiable injury.  Kelly v. Borwegen, 95 N.J. Super. 240, 243-
44, 230 A.2d 532, 534 (1967).  This requirement is based on a 
concern that "a jury should not be allowed to speculate on the 
issue of causation.  If the question of causal relation is so 
esoteric that lay minds cannot form any intelligent judgment 
about it without expert aid an opinion from an expert may be 
required."  Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 659 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(applying New Jersey law and citing 2 F. Harper & F. James, Jr. 
The Law of Torts § 20 at 15-16, § 21 at 1116-17 (1956)). 
The requirement is not without boundaries, however.  In Bushman, 
for example, we held that a "plaintiff is not required under New 
Jersey law to submit expert medical opinion on the element of 
legal causation to establish a prima facie case of negligence."  
Bushman, 798 F.2d at 653.  In that case, a plaintiff whose truck 
had collided with a United States Postal Service jeep sued the 
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging negligence.  
The trial court granted summary judgment to the government 
because the plaintiff had alleged only "soft tissue injuries" 
(i.e., he was seeking recovery only for pain and suffering 
related to an injury to his knees, which had struck the dashboard 
in the accident), and his expert witness had not opined that his 
pain was caused by the accident.  We reviewed Kelly and Menza and 
determined that New Jersey law requires a case-by-case analysis 
to determine when expert testimony is required to buttress 
  
subjective complaints of pain and suffering.  The key question is 
whether there is evidence tending to show some objective basis 
for the pain.  If there is, no expert testimony is needed because 
a jury is competent to decide whether there exists a causal 
connection. 
In Bushman,  
plaintiff testified that his legs were pain-free prior to 
the accident.  However, he stated that he experienced 
recurrent pain in his knees and surrounding soft 
tissues after they contacted his truck's dashboard 
during the accident. . . .  Plaintiff has adequately 
drawn into question the objective nature of his pain 
and suffering through his own sworn statements.  The 
pain and suffering plaintiff experienced immediately 
after the accident is directly linked to objectively 
identifiable symptoms of soft tissue injury verified in 
the medical evidence.  Thus, the lower court erred when 
it concluded that plaintiff's injuries were "not 
obviously related to an identifiable injury." 
Bushman, 798 F.2d at 660. 
Here, we are not apprised of any objective evidence supporting 
the plaintiffs' claims of emotional distress.  Neither the 
magistrate judge, nor the district court, nor this court has been 
presented any evidence of "objectively identifiable symptoms" 
upon which the plaintiffs rely to support their claims.  Absent 
such evidence, the alleged emotional distress in this case seems 
to resemble Menza and Kelly.  (In Menza, the plaintiff claimed 
chest pain 21 months after a fall, and in Kelly, the plaintiff 
alleged permanent difficulty in sleeping, walking, climbing steps 
and breathing after a car accident.)  Plaintiffs allege 
subjective claims of emotional distress, but we have no 
  
objectively identifiable, medically verified symptoms as the 
plaintiff had in Bushman. 
On the other hand, the magistrate judge's decision was made well 
before trial, when no evidence had yet been presented.  Some of 
the plaintiffs may be able to establish objectively identifiable 
symptoms from which a jury could infer causation even in the 
absence of an expert witness.  If, as to some or all plaintiffs, 
there exists other evidence tending to establish causation, such 
as objectively identifiable symptoms appearing close in time to 
Pacific Rail's takeover at North Bergen, then the plaintiffs who 
presented such evidence might not need to present expert evidence 
to reach the jury.  Thus, the magistrate judge's wholesale 
dismissal of all the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress 
damages without knowing anything more about each plaintiff's case 
was "contrary to law."  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  Plaintiffs' 
claims for emotional distress damages are to be reinstated on 
remand. 
 C. 
To further assist the district court on remand, we will also 
review plaintiffs' allegations that the court erred in dismissing 
the cases of five former PTL workers.  We will affirm its 
dismissal of all but one of those plaintiffs.  On remand, that 
one plaintiff's claims are to be reinstated for consideration of 
whether his cause of action survived his death. 
 1. 
Four of these plaintiffs' cases are easily addressed.  The 
district court properly dismissed the cases of David Quaid, John 
  
Gugliotta, Andrew Hennessey and Adam Lukasweski because the 
evidence was insufficient to support judgment for them as a 
matter of law. 
Quaid's case falters because of insufficient evidence from which 
a jury could conclude that he was injured.  Evidence at trial 
revealed that a Pacific Rail representative called Quaid three 
times to offer him a job, but Quaid did not accept.  The first 
time, September 1, Quaid told the representative that he was 
"number ten" on the list (presumably the union's seniority list) 
and that Pacific Rail would have to ask the nine men or women 
above him on the list before he would accept a job.  App. at 729-
30.  The second time, September 3, Quaid reiterated this and told 
the Pacific Rail representative he would get back to him.  App. 
at 730-31.  The third time, in the third week in September, the 
representative again told Quaid that Pacific Rail would like 
Quaid to work for the company.  Quaid said that he would work for 
Pacific Rail but did not accept the job because of ongoing union 
proceedings.  Specifically, he stated that he did not want to 
"jump[] before [he] knew where [he] was going to land and then 
wind[] up in limbo."  App. at 737.  Quaid stated at trial that he 
"never, never refused employment," "[n]ever turned [Pacific Rail] 
down," that "[Pacific Rail understood] that I wanted the job," 
and that "[a]ll I did was to ask [Pacific Rail] for time.  But 
there was [sic] never any refusals."  App. at 728.  Quaid's 
explanations, however, fail to negate the fact that he did not 
accept employment that was offered to him and cannot be 
  
considered to have been injured by Pacific Rail's actions when 
Pacific Rail actually offered him employment. 
Gugliotta, Hennessey and Lukasweski present similar situations.  
These three plaintiffs were receiving workers' compensation 
payments for medical conditions at the time Pacific Rail took 
over at North Bergen.  They could not have been denied jobs 
because of their age; they were not available to occupy positions 
when Pacific Rail needed them.  The only argument the plaintiffs 
advance in opposition to this reasoning is a contention that 
Pacific Rail would have offered them jobs even if they were 
injured but for age discrimination.  As evidence for this 
proposition, they note that a Pacific Rail representative, upon 
seeing Gugliotta in early September, asked Gugliotta if he was 
ready to work, thus impliedly offering him a job.  The 
representative's statement, however, was not exactly a job offer 
but was more in the nature of an inquiry about when Gugliotta 
might be ready to work.  App. at 1356.  Moreover, Gugliotta 
refused (id.), so even if it was a job offer, that merely 
transforms his particular case into one which resembles Quaid's 
more than Hennessey's and Lukasweski's.  Dismissal of their cases 
was not error. 
  
 2. 
Finally, we address the case of the estate of plaintiff Al 
Armetta, who passed away in December, 1991, after commencement of 
this lawsuit.  Plaintiffs' attorneys apparently learned of 
Armetta's death in August, 1992, and defense counsel was notified 
either then or on the first day of trial in mid-September, 1992.  
Plaintiffs' counsel never filed a "suggestion of death" or served 
formal written notice of the death on defense counsel or the 
court. 
At trial, upon learning of Armetta's death, the district court 
ruled that Armetta should be stricken from the case.  At the 
close of plaintiffs' case, in discussing directed verdict 
matters, plaintiffs' counsel argued that Armetta's estate should 
be considered a plaintiff for purposes of claiming damages until 
the time of his death.  The court refused because "there ha[d] 
been no substitution of Mr. Armetta's estate in this matter."  
App. at 964.  The district court judge stated that he did not 
"know that [Armetta's] estate has an interest in this matter," 
and pointed out that there was no "motion nunc pro tunc or . . . 
to relax the rules" about Armetta.  App. at 1018.  Plaintiffs' 
counsel stated that he had spoken with Armetta's widow, who had 
said she wanted to continue the lawsuit.  Id.  The court refused 
to accept this representation and, the next day, denied counsel's 
oral motion to substitute Mrs. Armetta for her husband, saying 
that plaintiffs had produced no proof that Mrs. Armetta was the 
executrix of Armetta's estate.  It rejected plaintiffs' counsel's 
offer to supply such proof.  Id. at 1023-26.  Specifically, the 
  
district court denied the motion because (1) it questioned 
whether this cause of action survived Armetta's death, 
(2) "[t]here has been no showing of excusable neglect . . . [or] 
actions on the part of the defendant which would put the 
plaintiff in a prejudicial position," (3) there was no proof that 
Mrs. Armetta was the executrix of Armetta's estate, and (4) it 
was too late to move to substitute Armetta's estate as a 
plaintiff because the defendant had had no chance to conduct 
discovery concerning "whoever the estate is" or "to do anything 
that is necessary to prepare for trial."  Id. at 1029-30. 
Rule 25(a)(1) provides: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, 
the court may order substitution of the proper parties.  
The motion for substitution may be made by any party or 
by the successors or representatives of the deceased 
party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall 
be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon 
persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 
for the service of a summons, and may be served in any 
judicial district.  Unless the motion for substitution 
is made not later than 90 days after the death is 
suggested upon the record by service of a statement of 
the fact of the death as provided here for the service 
of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the 
deceased party. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1).  Thus, if a party dies, ideally his or 
her attorney will file a "suggestion of death" with the court and 
serve it upon all parties.  After the suggestion of death is 
filed, a 90-day countdown begins.  Within 90 days, some other 
party or the executor or administrator of the deceased must move 
for substitution of the estate for the deceased, or the 
deceased's case will be dismissed.  Decisions on the motion for 
substitution are within the trial court's discretion.  Fed. R. 
  
Civ. P. 25(a) ("the court may order substitution"); Advisory 
Committee Note to 1963 Amendments. 
Nothing was ideal here.  Plaintiffs' counsel served neither a 
formal suggestion of death nor a formal motion for substitution.  
That does not mean, however, that the district court properly 
denied the motion made at trial to substitute Armetta's estate as 
the plaintiff claiming damages on his behalf.  Nothing in Rule 25 
says that a suggestion of death must be made or sets forth a time 
frame for doing it.  In circumstances in which the deceased's 
counsel only recently learned of the death, failure to file a 
suggestion of death within a particular period of time does not 
constitute sufficient grounds for refusing such a motion. 
Moreover, the district court's denial on the basis that the 
plaintiff did not make a formal motion, filed and served in 
accordance with Rule 25, also was, in our view, an overly strict 
interpretation of the rule.  We have indicated a willingness to 
permit lesser attempts to suffice.  See Anderson v. Republic 
Motor Inns, Inc., 444 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1971) (reversing a 
district court's dismissal of a case for failure to comply with 
Rule 25(a) because the plaintiff's attorney had noted in his 
pretrial memorandum that the wife, as executrix of the estate, 
intended to continue as substitute plaintiff).  In doing so, we 
have emphasized that our lenient view would apply only in "an 
extraordinary case, and that departure from the requirements of 
the Federal Rules is not to be permitted routinely," Anderson, 
444 F.2d at 89, but this case strikes us as extraordinary.  Here, 
the district court ruled that plaintiffs' counsel had failed to 
  
move for substitution within an appropriate time, yet the time 
period for so moving had not yet begun to run because death had 
not yet been suggested on the record.  Cf. 7C C. Wright, A. 
Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1955 at 544 
(2d ed. 1986) ("the time does not run until the death is 
suggested on the record").  Concerns about prejudice to the 
defendant are not well-placed in this instance, for the record 
reveals that defense counsel was notified of Armetta's death very 
shortly after plaintiffs' counsel became aware of it.  And, 
contrary to the district court's view, Rule 25 contains no 
"excusable neglect" standard by which the district court is to 
gauge its exercise of discretion.  We fully understand why the 
court might desire some written proof of Armetta's death and of 
the estate's desire to proceed with his case, but we see no 
reason not to permit plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to 
produce such proof before deciding the motion. 
Thus, we cannot find that the district court exercised sound 
discretion on this issue.  Armetta's claims should be re-examined 
on remand, and plaintiffs' counsel is to be given an opportunity 
to provide written proof of Armetta's death, his widow's 
relationship to his estate and the estate's wishes with regard to 
proceeding in this lawsuit.  Also on remand, however, the parties 
are to address the district court's first concern, namely whether 
Armetta's LAD claim survived his death.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
25(a)(1) (substitution permitted "[i]f a party dies and the claim 
is not thereby extinguished").  This issue is a matter of state 
law, cf. Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 1971); 
  
see N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:15-3, which we decline to resolve at this 
stage because the parties have neither briefed nor argued it 
either here or before the district court. 
 V. 
In conclusion, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
accept the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks as clarifying LAD 
law, just as Hicks did federal anti-discrimination law.  Our 
conclusion to that effect necessitates a remand of this case for 
retrial in accordance with this opinion.  On remand, although 
plaintiffs may not seek front pay, they may assert claims for 
emotional distress damages.  In addition, the claims of deceased 
plaintiff Al Armetta are to be reinstated so that the district 
court may consider whether Armetta's claims survived his death 
and, if so, so that his claims may be tried along with those of 
the other plaintiffs. 
Peter McKenna, et al. v. Pacific Rail Services, Nos. 93-5253, 
93-5277, 93-5375 and 93-5386 
 
 
 
MANSMANN, J., dissenting. 
 
 I. 
 I agree with the majority that our role is to determine 
whether the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt for the LAD the 
Supreme Court's analysis in Hicks.  Commissioner v. Estate of 
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1966); McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 976 (1980).  It is without doubt, as the majority holds, 
that were the New Jersey Supreme Court to apply the Hicks rule of 
law to the LAD, this case would require a new trial because the 
jury instructions did not provide the Hicks framework.14  See 
                     
14
.   Hicks settled conflicting decisions found among the 
courts of appeals regarding whether the jury's finding of 
employer pretext mandates the finding of illegal discrimination 
in Title VII cases.  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750.  The burdens of 
production and the order for the presentation of proof were set 
forth mainly in McDonald-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973), and then revisited in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).  Contrary to what we stated in 
Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 
(3d Cir. 1984), Hicks states that after a plaintiff makes a prima 
facie case of discrimination and the defendant rebuts that with 
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, the presumption raised by 
the prima facie case drops from the case, and the plaintiff now 
must show that the defendant's proffered reasons were not the 
true reasons for the employment decision and that the 
discriminating characteristic was.  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.  
No longer is it sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual.   
 
 Pacific Rail argues, first, that because the New Jersey 
courts have consistently applied the principles and analysis 
developed by the federal courts in Title VII age and sex 
discrimination claims, they would continue to do so in this 
  
 
Majority slip op. at 13.  It is in the majority's prediction of 
what the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that we part ways, 
and because I believe it will not adopt the Hicks analysis for 
the LAD, I respectfully dissent.15   
 We have, of course, previously articulated the proper 
standard to be used in predicting state law: 
 In attempting to forecast state law we "must 
consider relevant state precedents, analogous 
decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, 
and any other reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in 
the state would decide the issue at hand."   
 
McGowan v. University of Scranton, 759 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 
1985) (quoting McKenna, 622 F.2d at 663).  See also Blum v. Witco 
Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 376 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
 II. 
 
 Historically, as the majority correctly points out, 
Majority slip op. at 15-16, New Jersey has generally followed 
Title VII federal precedent in interpreting the LAD.  For a list 
of such cases, see Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 570 
(..continued) 
context.  The error in this reasoning is simply that it fails to 
consider that a new interpretation of the burden of proof has 
been established.  Second, Pacific Rail suggests that, because 
the plaintiffs originally argued that federal precedent should 
apply to this case, they are estopped now from changing their 
position before this court.  Such a contention is meritless, for 
again it fails to consider that a new rule regarding the various 
burdens has been established in the interim.  See Majority slip 
op. at 13 n.5.  
15
.   I join the court's analysis in Part IV. 
  
 
A.2d 903, 907 (N.J. 1990).  Nonetheless, as the majority also 
agrees, Majority slip op. at 16-17, New Jersey is not wedded to 
federal precedent and applies it selectively.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has stated:   
 
 In construing the terms of the LAD, the court 
has frequently looked to federal precedent 
governing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2000e-17 ("Title 
VII"), as "a key source of interpretative 
authority."  Although the "substantive and 
procedural standards that we have developed 
under the State's LAD have been markedly 
influenced by the federal experience,"  we 
have "applied the Title VII standards with 
flexibility" and "have not hesitated to 
depart" from federal precedent "if a rigid 
application of its standards is inappropriate 
under the circumstances." 
 
Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993) 
(citations to quotations omitted).  Grigoletti, 570 A.2d at 907 
("[T]he court has never embraced the McDonnell Douglas test 
literally, invariably or inflexibly."); Erickson v. Marsh & 
Mclennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 799 (N.J. 1990) ("We have recognized, 
however, that the criteria announced in Peper, Goodman, and 
Anderson provide only a general framework for analyzing unlawful 
discrimination claims and must be modified where appropriate."); 
Clowes v. Terminix Intern., Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 805 (N.J. 1988) 
("Under [certain] circumstances the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
should be used only to the extent that its application is 
appropriate."); Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 
389 A.2d 465, 479 (N.J. 1978) ("While we commend the McDonald-
  
 
Douglas standards to our trial courts as a starting point in 
actions brought under the Law Against Discrimination or any other 
State proscription against discrimination, it must be emphasized 
that these tests are to be used only where and to the extent that 
their application is appropriate.").   
 It is especially relevant that whenever federal 
precedent establishes a standard that makes it more difficult for 
the plaintiff to make its case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
departs.  Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d at 453 
(denouncing the Andrews test from this circuit and creating a new 
test for sexual harassment under the LAD); Montells v. Haynes, 
627 A.2d 654, 661 (N.J. 1993) (disregarding United States Supreme 
Court caselaw questioning prospective application of a new rule 
of law in a sexual harassment case under the New Jersey LAD); 
Grigoletti, 570 A.2d at 913 (adopting the EPA standard, which is 
more burdensome on the defendant, rather than the Title VII 
standard for gender discrimination claims); Anderson v. Exxon 
Co., 446 A.2d 486, 494 (N.J. 1982) (declining to follow the 
allocation of the burdens of proof established in McDonald-
Douglas to LAD claims for handicap discrimination); Castellano v. 
Linden Board of Education, 386 A.2d 396, 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1978), mod. on other grounds, 400 A.2d 1182 (N.J. 1979) 
  
 
(holding that pregnancy discrimination violated the LAD contrary 
to the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert).16 
                     
16
.   Similarly, the district courts in New Jersey have also 
recognized the independence of New Jersey courts in interpreting 
the LAD.   
 
 There is little reason to believe that New 
Jersey courts will exhibit slavish devotion 
to federal law in interpreting the NJLAD.  
Quite the contrary, in construing New Jersey 
antidiscrimination law, enacted nearly twenty 
years before the analogous federal statute 
prohibiting employment discrimination, see, 
Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 
436, 561 A.2d 1130 (1989); Nolan v. Otis 
Elevator Co., 102 N.J. 30, 48, 505 A.2d 580, 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S.Ct. 84, 93 
L.Ed. 2d 38 (1986), New Jersey courts have 
not considered themselves bound by federal 
caselaw, "even though [the NJLAD] relates 
essentially to the same subject matter as 
parallel federal civil rights law.  We are 
free to apply our own concept of that which 
is right and proper in the circumstances.  
Castellano v. Linden Board of Education, 158 
N.J. Super. 350, 360, 386 A.2d 396 (App. Div. 
1978) (holding that pregnancy discrimination 
violated NJLAD despite contrary United States 
Supreme Court precedent), modified on other 
grounds, 79 N.J. 407, 400 A.2d 1182 (1979).  
Moreover, "mindful of the clear and positive 
policy of our state against discrimination," 
New Jersey courts have consistently held that 
"[e]ffectuation of that mandate calls for 
liberal interpretation of any legislative 
enactment designed to implement it."  
Castellano, 158 N.J. Super. at 361, 386 A.2d 
396.   
 
Carrington v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 632, 
644 (D.N.J. 1991).  See also Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 841 F. 
Supp. 584, 590 (D.N.J. 1994) ("This court is not persuaded that 
the New Jersey State Supreme Court would disavow the standard 
enunciated in Slohoda [v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 504 A.2d 
53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)] to find that the NJLAD 
  
 
 
 In Castellano v. Linden Board of Education, 386 A.2d 
396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), the New Jersey Superior 
Court addressed whether requiring a pregnant female teacher to 
take a mandatory maternity leave and refusing to permit her to 
utilize accumulated sick leave during her childbirth absence 
constituted impermissible gender discrimination.  Id. at 354.  
The United States Supreme Court, prior to the decision in 
Castellano, held that a disability plan provided by an employer 
for all its employees, which paid weekly non-occupational 
sickness and accident benefits, but excluded from coverage 
disabilities arising from pregnancy, did not violate Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125 (1976).  See also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 
U.S. 136 (1977) (holding that an employer's policy of 
compensating employees for limited periods of time during which 
the employee missed work because of a non-job related illness or 
disability, but excluding sick leave paid to pregnant employees, 
was legally indistinguishable from the disability insurance 
(..continued) 
warrants application of the `sole motivating factor' test 
[announced in Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 
1993)] in pretext cases."); United States v. Board of Educ. of 
the Township of Piscataway, 798 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (D.N.J. 1992) 
("[T]here is nothing to indicate that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would exhibit a `slavish devotion' to federal law.").   
  
 
program in Gilbert).17  In response to Gilbert and Satty the New 
Jersey Superior Court stated: 
 Clearly, we are not bound by those decisions 
in construing our own statute, even though it 
relates essentially to the same subject 
matter as the parallel federal civil rights 
law.  We are free to apply our own concept of 
that which is right and proper in the 
circumstances.   
 
Id. at 401 (citing Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Tp., 371 
A.2d 1192 (N.J. 1977); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 
1975)).  Cf. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).   
 There have also been other areas where the New Jersey 
courts have departed from federal precedent.  In Lehmann v. Toys 
"R" Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court did not adopt the test we set forth in Andrews v. City of 
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990), for a sexual 
harassment claim under the LAD.  There we set forth a five factor 
test to determine an actionable claim for sexual harassment under 
Title VII, creating a test with both subjective and objective 
standards.  Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482-83.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court disavowed the Andrews test and found its own elements of a 
                     
17
.   Notably, on October 31, 1978, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was amended to include pregnancy-based 
discrimination in its prohibition of sex discrimination.  See 
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 478 U.S. 272, 284-85 
(1987). 
  
 
hostile work environment for a sexual harassment cause of action 
under the LAD.  Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 451-54.  The court stated: 
 We find that the standards expressed in the 
EEOC Guidelines, while helpful, are 
insufficiently structured to define the cause 
of action at this stage in the development of 
the law.  However, we agree with the dissent 
below that the Third Circuit's Andrews test 
employed by the majority below contains too 
many analytical difficulties and deficiencies 
to be usefully employed here. 
 
 Rather than risking confusion by engrafting 
major revisions to the Andrews test, we 
announce a new test in the hope of creating a 
standard that both employees and employers 
will be able to understand and one that 
employers can realistically enforce.  We 
cannot overstate the importance we place on a 
test that allows employees to know their 
rights in a given set of circumstances and 
that allows employers to set policies and 
procedures that comply with that test. 
 
Id. at 453.18 
 
 III. 
 In Lehman, the New Jersey Supreme Court also discussed 
the legislative intent and public policy behind the New Jersey 
LAD: 
 The New Jersey law against discrimination was 
first enacted in 1945.  Its purpose is 
"nothing less than the eradication `of the 
cancer of discrimination.'"  The opportunity 
to obtain employment "is recognized as and 
                     
18
.   Notably, the United States Supreme Court has recently 
undertaken to define the elements of a sexual harassment claim 
under Title VII.  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 
367 (1993).   
  
 
declared to be a civil right."  N.J.S.A. 
10:5-4. 
 
 The LAD was enacted to protect not only the 
civil rights of individual aggrieved 
employees but also to protect the public's 
strong interest in a discrimination-free 
workplace.  Freedom from discrimination is 
one of the fundamental principles of our 
society.  Discrimination based on gender is 
"peculiarly repugnant in a society which 
prides itself on judging each individual by 
his or her merits."   
 
Id. at 451-52 (case citations to quotations omitted).  See also 
Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 561 A.2d 1130, 1131-32 (N.J. 1989); 
Anderson v. Exxon Co., 446 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. 1982) ("Our court 
has repeatedly emphasized the strong public policy of New Jersey 
against employment discrimination.").  In Fuchilla v. Laman, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court engaged in a similar discussion of the 
public policy in New Jersey:  
 We begin by recognizing that the clear public 
policy of this state is to abolish 
discrimination in the workplace.  Indeed, the 
overarching goal of the law is nothing less 
than the eradication "of the cancer of 
discrimination."  Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 
N.J. 113, 124 (1969).  As the Legislature has 
declared, "discrimination threatens not only 
the rights and proper privileges of the 
inhabitants of the State but menaces the 
institutions and functions of a free 
democratic state."  N.J.S.A. 10:5-3.  The day 
is long past when any employee need endure 
discrimination because of his or her race, 
religion, national origin, or gender.  
Employment discrimination is not just a 
matter between employer and employee.  The 
public interest in a discrimination-free 
workplace infuses the inquiry.  David v. 
Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 327 (1965).   
  
 
 
Fuchilla v. Laman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J. 1988), cert. denied, 
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey v. Fuchilla, 
488 U.S. 826 (1988).19  These passages relied in part on the New 
Jersey Legislature's declaration that employment in New Jersey 
shall be free from discrimination.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-3, 5-4.  
For the full text, see Majority slip op. at 15 n.6.  I find this 
proclamation overwhelmingly persuasive. 
 I am cognizant of other New Jersey caselaw stating the 
contrary: 
 In a sex discrimination case arising under 
the N.J. L.A.D., our supreme court held that 
the test for prima facie showing was the same 
as that used in federal cases arising under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Because the provisions of the ADEA were 
modeled after Title VII and are nearly 
identical in wording and purpose, Title VII 
standards are applied to ADEA cases.  We thus 
conclude, as did the judge below, that 
plaintiffs' contentions should appropriately 
be analyzed by examination of federal cases 
arising under Title VII and the ADEA.   
 
                     
19
.   Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has led the 
way in furthering the rights of employees in other areas.  Shebar 
v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp., 544 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1988) (oral 
promise of discharge for cause only, even though employment was 
terminable at will, may be enforceable); Woolley v. Hoffmann-
LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (a written implied 
promise of discharge for cause only, even though employment was 
terminable at will, may be enforceable); Pierce v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) (adopting a 
general public policy exception to employment at will recognizing 
that an at-will employee cannot be discharged for reasons 
contrary to public policy).   
  
 
Giammarino v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., 497 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), cert. denied, 508 A.2d 212 (1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) (citations omitted).  However, 
in that case the court followed Supreme Court precedent because, 
at the time, the Supreme Court was consistent with New Jersey 
public policy.  This does not lead to the conclusion that New 
Jersey will continue to follow the Supreme Court.  The above 
passage was correct when stated, but is now doubtful.  Cf. Clowes 
v. Terminix Intern, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 802 (N.J. 1988) (holding 
that alcoholism is a handicap under the New Jersey LAD:  "We 
begin our analysis from the perspective that because the [LAD] is 
remedial social legislation, it is deserving of a liberal 
construction."). 
 
 IV. 
 The major premise of the majority's opinion is that the 
New Jersey rule regarding presumptions parallels the federal rule 
of presumptions upon which Hicks is based.  Majority slip op. at 
18.  I am not persuaded that the New Jersey rule so closely 
resembles the federal rule that it justifies serving as the basis 
of this decision, particularly in light of the liberal anti-
discrimination policy adopted by both the New Jersey Legislature 
and the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
 The Federal Rule of Evidence on presumptions states: 
  In all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or 
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the 
  
 
party against whom it is directed the burden 
of going forward with evidence to rebut or 
meet the presumption, but does not shift to 
such party the burden of proof in the sense 
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains 
throughout the trial upon the party on whom 
it was originally cast. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 301.  The New Jersey rule on presumptions states: 
  Except as otherwise provided in Rule 303 
or by other law, a presumption discharges the 
burden of producing evidence as to a fact 
(the presumed fact) when another fact (the 
basic fact) has been established. 
 
  If evidence is introduced tending to 
disprove the presumed fact, the issue shall 
be submitted to the trier of fact for 
determination unless the evidence is such 
that reasonable persons would not differ as 
to the existence or nonexistence of the 
presumed fact.  If no evidence tending to 
disprove the presumed fact is presented, the 
presumed fact shall be deemed established if 
the basic fact is found or otherwise 
established.  The burden of persuasion as to 
the proof or disproof of the presumed fact 
does not shift to the party against whom the 
presumption is directed unless otherwise 
required by law.  Nothing in this rule shall 
preclude the judge from commenting on 
inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence. 
 
N.J. R. Evid. 301.  A comparison of the two rules reveals that 
the federal rule "bursts the bubble" of the presumption, while 
the New Jersey rule creates an issue for the jury.  Although the 
New Jersey rule does not necessarily follow Morgan's theory of 
presumptions20 that the party resisting the presumption must 
                     
20
.   See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2493c (Chadbourn 
rev. 1981). 
  
 
introduce sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption, it is 
certainly not an enactment of Thayer's "bursting bubble"21 -- it 
falls somewhere along the continuum between the two.  One 
commentator has placed the New Jersey rule closer to Morgan's 
theory than Thayer's because in New Jersey the evidence 
supporting the presumption or possibly even the presumption 
itself remains.  Ralph N. Del Deo & John H. Klock, 2B New Jersey 
Practice Ch. 3 at 334 (1987).22  Although the author was 
commenting on the former New Jersey rule on presumptions, Rule 
14, a comparison between Rule 14 and Rule 301 does not reveal any 
substantial change.  The text of the first sentence of the second 
paragraph of Rule 301 is essentially the same as Rule 14.  The 
added language does not change the effect of the rule.  Rule 14 
states: 
  Except as provided by Rule 15, if 
evidence to the contrary of a presumed fact 
                     
21
.   See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2490 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1981). 
22
.   The New Jersey Model Jury Charges - Civil (4th ed. 
1992) for employment cases supports this interpretation.  In the 
section dealing with retaliation for a discrimination claim -- 
the only section that discusses the effect of the presumption -- 
the model charge cites to Jamison v. Rockaway Township Bd. of 
Educ., 577 A.2d 177, 182 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (citing 
Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 
(9th Cir. 1984)), for the proposition that once the plaintiff 
proves that the defendant's articulated reason for the alleged 
discriminatory action is false, a presumption is created that the 
adverse employment action was the product of improper retaliatory 
intent and the defendant is required to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the adverse action would have been taken 
regardless of retaliatory intent.  Model Jury Charges - Civil, 
Ch. 2 § 22C.  
  
 
is offered, the existence or nonexistence of 
such fact shall be for the trier of fact, 
unless the evidence is such that the minds of 
reasonable men would not differ as to the 
existence or nonexistence of the presumed 
fact. 
 
See also Majority slip op. at 23 n.10.  Rule 14 and presently 
effective Rule 301 do not follow the previous rule, which was 
interpreted to be an enactment of Thayer's theory.  In Dwyer v. 
Ford Motor Co., 178 A.2d 161, 171 (N.J. 1962), the court held 
that a presumption of fact is emptied of all probative force and 
disappears from the case upon introduction of any proof to the 
contrary.  Cf. McGlynn v. Newark Parking Auth., 432 A. 2d 99, 105 
(N.J. 1981).  When Rule 14 was enacted, the Commission Note 
accompanying the new rule explained it this way:  
 This rule changes existing law.  The rule has 
been that if contrary evidence was 
introduced, the presumption was gone . . . .  
Under this rule a fact issue remains, with no 
distinction between "logical" and 
"artificial" presumptions.  The effect of the 
rule is that (a) if there is no evidence to 
contradict either the underlying fact or the 
assumed fact, the assumed fact must be taken 
to exist and the jury should be so instructed 
. . .; and (b) if there is evidence to 
contradict either the underlying fact or the 
assumed fact . . ., the jury is to determine 
the existence of the assumed fact as on any 
other contest issue. 
 
Ralph N. Del Deo & John H. Klock, 2B New Jersey Practice Ch. 3 at 
334 (1987). 
 Although this interpretation has not been formally 
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, its existence 
  
 
demonstrates that reasonable minds can differ on the issue.  That 
being the case, I cannot conclude that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would follow the Supreme Court's analysis in Hicks, 
particularly in light of New Jersey's public policy to eradicate 
discrimination from the workplace.  At least one other state 
supreme court has chosen not follow Hicks because it has 
interpreted its own rule of evidence on presumptions differently.  
Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 
1992). 
 
 V. 
 Because New Jersey is clearly dedicated to preserving a 
low threshold for establishing a civil rights violation with 
regard to employment discrimination,23 I would hold that the New 
Jersey Supreme court will not adopt for the LAD the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Hicks. 
                     
23
.   In sum, the LAD provides a distinctive cause 
of action arising from unlawful employment 
practices and unlawful discrimination in 
employment.  The overarching goals of the LAD 
are not only vindication for aggrieved 
individuals victimized by discrimination.  
Protection for other persons similarly 
situated and the eradication of invidious 
discrimination in the exercise of civil 
rights are also paramount concerns of the 
LAD.  The LAD confers broad and extensive 
remedial powers to fulfill these goals and to 
counteract the practices and effects of such 
unlawful practices and discrimination.  
 
 Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp, 561 A.2d 1130, 1136 (N.J. 1989).   
